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Alaily: MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 380 F.3D 1154 (9TH CIR. 2004)

CASE SUMMARIES

MGM STUDIOS, INC. V. GROKSTER LTD.
380 F.3D 1154 (9TH CIR. 2004)
I. INTRODUCTION

In yet another copyright infringement battle centered on the filesharing debate, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit was required to make a ruling that would affect the
entertainment industry. 1 The case at issue, MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, was consolidated from a number of lower court cases in
which most of the major motion picture studios and recording
companies ("Copyright Owners") sued companies who freely
distribute software ("Software Distributors") that allows users to
share computer files, including digitized music and motion
pictures.2 The Copyright Owners alleged that more than "90% of
the files exchanged through the use of the 'peer-to-peer' file
sharing software offered by the defendants involved copyrighted
material." 3 The plaintiffs therefore argued that the defendants
were liable for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement.4
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted the defendant Software Distributors partial
summary judgment on issues of contributory and vicarious
infringement and the plaintiffs appealed.5 It was these issues that
the Ninth Circuit was called upon to resolve on appeal.6 The court
began by making a cursory examination into the technical aspects
of how users share files in the peer-to-peer system, and
subsequently analyzed separately the contributory copyright
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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infringement and vicarious copyright infringement claims.7 After
a thorough analysis, the court affirmed the summary judgment
granted to the defendants on both issues, and remanded the case
for resolution on issues it was not called upon to decide.'
II. BACKGROUND

This case resulted from a copyright dispute between several
motion picture studios and recording companies, and companies
that distribute software that allows users to share digitized music
and motion pictures without compensating the works' copyright
holders.9 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, this case was the latest
reprisal of a recurring conflict between the recording industry and
distributors of file-sharing computer software.' ° The question of
direct copyright infringement (i.e. regarding the people who
download the copyrighted material) was not at issue in this case."
Rather, the Copyright Owners alleged that the Software
Distributors were liable for making available the software that endusers employ to share files and download copyrighted material.'2
The basis of this argument was set on two recognized theories of
secondary copyright liability: contributory copyright infringement
and vicarious liability infringement. 3 Specifically, the Copyright
Owners alleged that more than "90% of the files exchanged
through use of the peer-to-peer file-sharing software offered by the
Software Distributors involved copyrighted material, 70% of
which was owned by the Copyright Owners."' 4
The Ninth Circuit asserted that an understanding of the peer-topeer file-sharing software was required in order to analyze the

7. MGMStudios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1158-60.
8. Id. at 1167.
9. Id. at 1158.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1160.
12. Id.
13. MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1160.
14. Id. at 1158.
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"In a peer-to-peer distribution network, the
issues properly.
information available for access does not reside on a central
server", so "no single computer contains all of the information that
is available to all of the users."' 6 Rather, "each computer makes
information available to every other computer in the peer-to-peer
network," which is called a decentralized system.17 Because the
information is decentralized, the software must provide a method
of cataloguing the content for users to access it successfully. 8 The
software relevant to this case operated by connecting users, via the
Internet, to other users of the same or similar software who could
then search the index of files of other users who were also
connected. 9 The software distributed by the defendants in this
case was distributed free of charge.2" After dispensing with a
quick explanation of the peer-to-peer file-sharing process, the
court was ready to analyze the two theories of secondary copyright
liability asserted by the plaintiffs.2
The district court had
previously granted summary judgment on the contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement portions of the underlying
lawsuit, and the Ninth Circuit was called on to resolve the issues
raised by the Copyright Owners on appeal. 2
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. ContributoryCopyrightInfringement
The first issue the Ninth Circuit analyzed was the Copyright
Owner's claim of contributory copyright infringement by the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MGMStudios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1158.
Id. at 1159-60.

21. Id. at 1160.
22. Id.at 1158.
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Software Distributors.23 The court set out three elements that the
Copyright Owners were required to prove on such a claim: (1)
direct infringement by a primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the
infringement, and (3) material contribution to the infringement.24
The issue of direct infringement was undisputed; the Court began
its analysis with the knowledge element."
1. Knowledge
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that any analysis in this area of
law must be siphoned from the Supreme Court's decision in SonyBetamax.26 There, the Supreme Court held that "the sale of video
tape recorders could not give rise to contributory copyright
infringement liability even though the defendant knew the
machines were being used to commit infringement. ' 27 The
important rule of law extracted from Sony-Betamax was that a
defendant could defeat a claim of contributory copyright
infringement if it showed that the product was "capable of
substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses. '"28
The Ninth Circuit, previously in 200129 ruled that if "a product is
capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing
uses, then the copyright owner must demonstrate that the
defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files,
and failed to act on that knowledge to prevent infringement."30 In
the present case, the court found there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the Software Distributors' software was capable
of substantial non-infringing uses."
The court noted that

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 1160.
Id.
MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1160.
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.

417 (1984)).
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
29. A & M Records v. Napster (NapsterI), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
30. MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1161.

31. Id.
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"thousands" of musical groups had authorized free distribution of
their music, and "thousands" of public domain literary works were
also made available through the software.32 Having decided that
the software had a substantial non-infringing use, the court needed
to decide whether the Copyright Owners had raised sufficient
genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendant's
reasonable knowledge of specific infringement.33 The court held
that the "plaintiffs' notices of infringing conduct were irrelevant
because they arrived when the defendants could do nothing to
facilitate or stop the alleged infringement of specific copyrighted
content."3 4 In other words, because of the decentralized system
that the software offers to users, even if the Software Distributors
"closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their
control, users of their products could continue sharing files with
little or no interruption."35 Considering the analysis above, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Software Distributors were entitled to
partial summary judgment on the element of knowledge.36
2. Material Contribution
In deciding whether the defendants had materially contributed to
copyright infringement, the Ninth Circuit cited Napster I for the
proposition that the Software Distributors would materially
contribute to infringement if they provided the site and facilities
for direct infringement.37 Here, the court held that the record from
the lower court showed that the Software Distributors did not
provide the site and facilities for infringement.38 The Ninth Circuit
first noted that, had the defendants been true access providers, a
"failure to disable that access after acquiring specific knowledge of
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1162.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1163.
36. MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1163.
37. Id. (citing A & M Records v. Napster (Napster I), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
38. Id.
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a user's infringement might have been material contribution."39
Second, if the defendants "stored files or indices, a failure to delete
the offending files or offending index listings might have been
material contributions." 4
However, the court ruled that the
Software Distributors were neither access providers nor provided
storage and index maintenance."' Rather, the court held it was the
"users of the software who, by connecting to each other over the
Internet, created the network and provided the access. "42 It made
clear that the defendants could not contribute to infringement that
takes place on another person's computer, ruling that "failure to
alter software located on another's computer was simply not akin
to the failure to delete a filename from one's own computer, to the
failure to cancel the registration name and password of a particular
user from one's user list, or to the failure to make modification to
software on one's own computer."43 Therefore, the court held that
the defendants did not materially contribute to infringement of
plaintiffs copyright, and granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the overall issue of contributory copyright
infringement.'
B. Vicarious CopyrightInfringement
The Ninth Circuit next analyzed the second argument made by
the Copyright Owners - that the defendants were liable for
vicarious copyright infringement.4" The Court set out three
required elements to prove vicarious copyright infringement: (1)
direct infringement by a primary party, (2) a direct financial
benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right and ability to supervise
the infringers.46 The first two elements were undisputed, so the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
MGMStudios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1163.
Id. at 1163-64.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
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court was required to rule only on whether the Software
Distributors had the right and ability to supervise the actions of the
end-users who downloaded the copyrighted material from the
Internet.47
The right and ability to supervise describes a relationship
between file-sharing software providers and direct infringers.48
The Ninth Circuit began by acknowledging that a salient
characteristic of such a relationship can be a formal licensing
agreement between the provider and the direct infringers." For
example, the court noted in Napster I that it was especially
pertinent that Napster had an express policy reserving the right to
block infringers' access for any reason." Specifically, Napster had
the right and ability to supervise Napster users because it
"controlled the central indices of files, users were required to
register with Napster, and access to the system depended on the
validity of a user's registration."'" Here, the court held that there
was no evidence that any of the Software Distributors had the
Specifically, the
ability to block access to individual users."
defendants either nominally reserved the right to terminate access
or did not maintain a licensing agreement with persons who
downloaded their products. 3 The court noted that, of those
defendants who did nominally reserve some right to terminate
access, they had a lack of a registration and log-in process and had
no ability to actually terminate access to file-sharing functions. 4
Moreover, the court held that the alleged ability to shut down
operations altogether, which is what the Copyright Owners
demanded, is "more akin to stopping the distribution of software
altogether, rather than the ability to exclude individual

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
MGMStudios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1164.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id.
MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1165.
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participants."55
While it was becoming clear that the Ninth Circuit was building
it's reasoning to hold that there was no vicarious copyright
infringement, the Copyright Owners argued that the defendants'
"software itself could be altered to prevent users from sharing
copyrighted files."56 The court rejected the argument, noting that
the Copyright Owners were confusing the right and ability to
supervise with the strong duty imposed on entities that have
already been found to be liable for vicarious copyright
infringement.57 For example, once Napster had been found
vicariously liable for copyright infringement, it was required by
the court to do everything feasible to block files from its system
that contained noticed copyrighted works.58 The court went on to
clarify that the duty placed on Napster, for example, is not the
same as the "ability" contemplated by the "right and ability to
supervise" test. 9
The Copyright Owners made one final effort at satisfying their
burden.6" They argued that the Software Distributors should not be
able to escape vicarious liability by turning a "blind eye" to the
infringement of their users, and that "turning a blind eye to
detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to
liability. ' 61 The Ninth Circuit discarded the argument, ruling that
"although such rhetoric had occasionally been employed in
describing vicarious copyright infringement, there was no separate
'blind eye' theory or element of vicarious liability that existed
6
independently of the traditional elements of liability.
Considering the analysis above in its totality, the court held that
the Software Distributors did not have the right and ability to
supervise the direct infringers in this case, and therefore the claim
55. Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1165-66.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1166.
MGM Studios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1166.
Id.
Id.
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of vicarious copyright infringement could not succeed.63
IV. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit concluded there were no genuine issues of
material fact on the issues of contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement, affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment. 64 For the moment, the Software Distributors have
overcome an attack by the film and recording industries.65 The
court did not analyze the other issues presented in the case and
remanded for resolution of the remaining issues.66
Adham Alaily

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1158.
MGMStudios, Inc., 380 F.3d at 1167.
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